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INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States shares with many other countries the goal of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change “to achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.”1 The critical role of new technologies in achieving this goal is underscored by 
the fact that most anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted over the next century will 
come from equipment and infrastructure that has not yet been built. As a result, new technologies 
and fuels have the potential to transform the nation’s energy system while meeting climate 
change as well as energy security and other goals. 
 
Many believe that advancing clean energy technologies2 could significantly reduce the cost of 
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations.3 Further, if many technologies are successfully 
developed in parallel with early action to promote deployment, the cost of stabilization could be 
significantly reduced. The assumed availability of future technologies is a strong driver of 
stabilization costs in most climate change models.4 Edmonds et al.5 studied stabilization of 
atmospheric CO2 concentration at 550 ppmv (parts per million by volume) and showed that the 
accelerated pace of technology improvements and deployment could produce a reduction in costs 
of a factor of 2.5 in 2100 relative to a baseline incorporating the “business as usual” rate of 
technical change.  
 
Given the need for large-scale GHG emission reductions, the challenge is to move toward 
actions that go beyond technology R&D to strategies that target the rapid and large-scale 
absorption of GHG-reducing technologies into the economy.6 Most technological innovations do 
not survive the transition from invention to marketplace success. While they may be technically 
feasible, various obstacles prevent them from gaining market share. In addition, best practices 
representing already proven cost-effective approaches to GHG mitigation, are significantly 
underutilized. The longevity of much of the energy infrastructure from power plants to the 
building stock, prolongs the operation of obsolete technologies, and other impediments cause 
suboptimal choices to be made when technologies do finally turn over. 
 
While there are many barriers to the commercialization and deployment of clean energy 
technologies, those that are imposed by legislatures and regulators are particularly of interest as 
they operate at cross-purposes with government stated intentions of GHG reductions.  This paper 
focuses on the legal barriers to the deployment of clean energy technologies that come from fiscal 
policy, regulation and statutes.  For each policy realm – fiscal, regulatory, and statutory – 
distortionary policies are discussed. In some cases these policies are unfavorable because they 
place clean energy technologies at a disadvantage, sometimes by favoring competing 
technologies. In other cases they are ineffective because their intended outcome is undermined by 
policy design flaws, loopholes, and burdensome procedures that circumvent the policy goal. Still 
in other instances policies are uncertain because of state and local variability, fluctuating short-
term policies, and extended debates about alternative future policy scenarios that can forestall 
commitments to clean energy or accelerate investments in carbon-intensive energy options. In the 
aggregate, these barriers act to confuse investors, consumers, inventors, and producers in their 
decisions relative to clean energy technologies. 
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This assessment of distortionary policies relies on a review of the literature on barriers to clean 
energy technologies and 27 expert interviews. These interviews with experts from government, 
national laboratories, industry, universities, and consulting firms provided an up-to-date 
overview of market and technology conditions and associated barriers, along with substantial 
detail on the nature of the market imperfections as well as illustrative deployment failures and 
successes. 
 
I. FISCAL BARRIERS 
 
Fiscal barriers are impediments related to taxation and public revenue and debt policies 
promulgated by governments that impact markets in which a clean energy technology is 
expected to compete. They can take many forms such as tax incentives and penalties, liability 
insurance, leases and land rights-of-way, waste disposal, and guarantees to mitigate project 
financing or fuel price risk. While fiscal policies are imposed in pursuit of the public good, they 
can become impediments to innovation and competition, and they can be unfavorable to clean 
energy technologies.  In addition, fluctuating and variable tax incentives as well as the possibility 
of future tax penalties related to GHG emissions all contribute to fiscal uncertainty, which can 
undermine marketplace efficiency.  
 
A. Unfavorable Fiscal Policies 
 
Fiscal policies can be used to encourage investment in a particular technology area or to 
overcome market failures.  However, technologies and goals can change quicker than fiscal 
policy, leading to outdated fiscal instruments, which then incentivize undesired behaviors or 
technologies.  A variety of tax subsidies, differential taxation across capital and operating 
expenses, unfavorable tariffs, and utility pricing policies illustrate this phenomenon. 
 
1. Tax subsidies. Existing tax subsidies can act as barriers to the commercialization and 
deployment of GHG-reducing technologies. For example, subsidies for conventional fuels, both 
implicit and explicit, can significantly lower final energy prices, putting alternative energy 
options at a competitive disadvantage unless they enjoy equally large tax assistance.  
 
The transportation sector offers examples of policies that provide tax advantages for 
conventional energy sources and encourage high levels of energy consumption.  
 
• The internal revenue code provides business deductions for the purchase of large light 
trucks (> 6,000 lbs)7 that amount to a tax break – encouraging the purchase of large light 
trucks when they may not be needed.8  Originally established as a form of tax relief for 
small business owners, large light trucks (especially, sports utility vehicles – SUVs – 
which are considered light trucks) are increasingly purchased by families for personal 
use. This particular issue made waves in the print media in 2003 when the popular luxury 
vehicle, Hummer H2, was made an example.9  In October 2004, the allowable first year 
tax deduction under internal revenue code section 179 was reduced dramatically (from 
$105,000 to $25,000), but this smaller incentive is still available for large light trucks.10 
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• The gas-guzzler tax on cars (but not on light trucks) has discouraged the purchase of cars 
and encouraged the purchase of SUVs.11 This tax was created with the Energy Tax Act of 
1978;12 current taxes, which have been in effect since 1991, range from $1,000 to $7,700 
per vehicle depending on the fuel economy of the car beginning at 22.5 mpg.13 By taxing 
fuel-inefficient cars, this tax policy has effectively eliminated the mass production of gas-
guzzling cars, but it has not reduced energy consumption. Because gas-guzzler taxes have 
not been applied to trucks, they have created an incentive to produce gas-guzzler vehicles 
as “trucks.”14  
 
Examples in the realm of energy resource development include oil depletion allowances which 
allow owners to claim a depletion deduction for loss of their reserves. Specifically, oil and gas 
wells can claim cost depletion and in some cases percentage depletion.15  Also, government 
support for research on the production of liquid fuels from coal and the production of petroleum 
from shale oil and tar sands can appear as barriers to low-carbon alternative fuels. If successful, 
this research would promote the continued use of high-GHG transportation fuels. These fiscal 
incentives exemplify the problem of conflicting social goals. They exist because of the public 
desire to promote U.S. oil independence and energy security, but they conflict with the goal of 
stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. 
 
2. Unequal taxation of capital and operating expenses. Tax policies that encourage operating 
expenses and penalize capital expenses serve to slow capital stock turnover, preclude 
technological change, and result in the over consumption of energy products and the over 
production of GHG emissions.  Examples of this issue are evident in industry, buildings, and 
energy supply. 
 
In American industry, the current federal tax code discourages capital investments in general, as 
opposed to direct expensing of energy costs. In addition, the federal tax code forces firms to 
depreciate energy efficiency investments over a longer period of time than many other 
investments (e.g., only five years for a new data center). This is partly because energy-efficient 
products have long depreciable lives, such as 15 years for a new motor or a new industrial boiler. 
Interestingly, a new back-up generator would be depreciated over three years while a new 
combined heat and power (CHP) system would be depreciated over 20 years.16 The CHP system 
would provide both reliability and energy efficiency while the back-up generator provides 
reliability at the expense of energy efficiency and clean air. This is another case of legislation 
lagging behind (and inhibiting) technological progress.  Federal depreciation schedules were put 
into place more than two decades ago as part of the IRS Reform Act of 1986, and they have not 
kept up with technological innovations.17 Modification of depreciation schedules would remove 
a significant barrier to industrial efficiency investments, but it would require legislative action.18  
 
Similarly, as buildings are capital expenses, these fiscal policies retard buildings turnover in all 
sectors. U.S. tax rules require capital costs for commercial buildings and other investments to be 
depreciated over many years, whereas operating costs can be fully deducted from taxable 
income.19 Since efficient technologies typically cost more than standard equipment on a first-cost 
basis, this tax code penalizes efficiency.  
 
4 
Fig. 1.  Projected Costs of New Generation and  
Energy Efficiency Improvement 
 
In the electricity supply market, Jenkins et al. have shown that projects with high capital versus 
expense ratios have higher tax burdens.20 Interestingly, this is a market in which a mix of capital-
intensive and expense-intensive technologies compete. For example, wind and nuclear plants 
have proportionately high capital costs while natural gas combined cycle and coal plants have 
proportionately high fuel (i.e., operating) costs (Fig. 1).21 Reducing the demand for electricity by 
improving the efficiency 
of energy use is the least-
cost way to deliver new 
energy services.  Because 
its capital-to-operating 
ratio is particularly low, 
energy efficiency is 
fiscally disadvantaged as 
an electricity “resource.” 
The problem is that 
capital and operating costs 
receive different tax 
treatment, and these 
differences result in 
unequal tax loads between 
projects built using 
different technologies. 
Jenkins et al. compared the tax loads associated with constructing and owning eight different 
renewable power plants22 with the tax load of constructing and owning a natural gas-fired 
generation plant. All but one of the eight renewable projects were found to carry higher tax 
burdens under the tax codes in place in 1999. Whether or not this remains true today is unclear, 
given the expanded incentives provided for renewable energy in EPAct and other fiscal policy 
changes. Assuming capital-intensive technologies still have a differentially higher tax burden 
than expense-intensive technologies in the electricity generation market, the competitiveness of 
both renewable and nuclear technologies is reduced as a result. 
 
Many states have similarly uneven sales tax treatment of capital vs. operating expenses. For 
instance, most states charge sales tax on residential energy-saving devices but not on residential 
fuels and electricity. Recognizing this disparity, several states now offer periodic sales tax 
moratoria for the purchase of ENERGY STAR® appliances. Georgia, Florida, and Virginia have 
adopted temporary (three- and five-day) sales tax holidays for certain energy-efficient products, 
and Connecticut has an 18-month tax holiday on home weatherization products.23  Similar 
holidays are being considered by Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.24 
 
Clean energy innovations diffuse slowly through the economy in many cases because of the long 
lifetime of existing productive capital stock, and because of the major investment in hardware and 
infrastructure that is required for significant market penetration. Power plants may operate for 40 
or 50 years, commercial buildings last almost as long, heavy trucks are driven for 28 years, and 
cars for 17 years.25 As John Holdren put it: “We’ve got a $12 trillion capital investment in the 
world energy economy and a turnover time of 30 to 40 years. If you want it to look different in 30 
or 40 years, you’d better start now.”26  To quicken the pace of change, stock turnover must be 
5 
Fig. 2.  Examples of Capital Stock Lifetimes 
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accelerated by removal of policies that retard capital investments. Policy options for accelerating 
turnover include taxing consumption instead of income or decreasing taxes on income from 
capital investments. “Anything that reduces the effective marginal tax rate on capital investments 
will result in accelerated capital stock turnover.”27 
 
Capital stock turnover is obviously paced differently for different technologies, as shown in Fig. 
2.28  The long-lived energy infrastructure systems of highways, buildings, power plants, and 
transmission lines 
are distinct from 
the shorter lifespan 
of most energy 
end-use products. 
This infrastructure 
longevity 
contributes to the 
“lock-in” of 
incumbent 
technologies.29 
Companies must 
take into 
consideration the 
risks involved with 
adopting a new 
technology, the 
payback period of 
a technology, and the appropriate discount rate and transaction costs. Newer, relatively 
expensive technologies have longer payback periods and represent a greater risk. Thus, “lock-in” 
not only slows technological change in general but also tends to skew it toward suboptimal 
choices.30 
 
Given that the slow rate of capital stock turnover in many industries has been identified as a key 
barrier to the introduction of a new generation of carbon mitigation technologies, tax reforms 
that lower the tax burdens of energy construction projects relative to energy consumption 
activities warrant consideration.31  
 
3. Unfavorable tariffs. Tariffs imposed by government can present a barrier to clean energy 
technologies.  The following examples draw from the markets for alternative fuels and electric 
power. 
 
The import tariff for ethanol is an example of a policy that raises the cost of ethanol blends 
produced by domestic refineries. The market for fuel ethanol is heavily dependent on incentives 
and regulations.32 In 1980, the U.S. Congress imposed a 54 cent per gallon tariff on imported 
ethanol to promote energy independence.33 In addition, the U.S. government provides the 
domestic ethanol industry with a 51 cent tax credit per gallon,34 and EPAct 200535 requires 
refineries to use 4 billion gallons of ethanol in 2007, climbing to 7.5 million gallons in 2012. 
With the refineries choosing to phase-out MTBE in 2007, the demand for ethanol is even greater 
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than expected, and it is not clear if the domestic supply will be able to meet the growing demand. 
The import tariff prevents refineries from buying ethanol from wherever it is cheapest on the 
global market, as from Brazil where ethanol production from sugarcane costs are 40 to 50 
percent less than U.S. ethanol production from corn.36 
 
Independent System Operators (ISOs) also can create tariffs that bar new technologies.  These 
tariffs are effectively connection (market entry) charges although they are not called such. For 
example, small generators hoping to connect to the grid in the mid-Atlantic area must undergo a 
review at a cost of $10,000 to the generator before being allowed to tap into the ISO-PJM 
(Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland) interconnection.37 Other tariffs levied by individual 
utilities on customers include standby charges, buyback rates, and uplift fees.  
 
4. Utility pricing policies. Unfavorable electricity pricing policies and rate recovery 
mechanisms present obstacles for an array of clean energy technologies; these include the 
regulated rate structure, lack of time-of-use pricing, and imbalance penalties.  The origin of 
many of these policies often is based on historically long-standing practices that have been 
incrementally modified over years of regulatory oversight.38  
 
In traditionally regulated electricity markets, electric utilities face little incentive to promote 
energy efficiency or non-dispatchable distributed generation because utility company profits are a 
function of sales. Under current rate designs, companies that own transmission lines also benefit 
from throughput, and find their profits reduced by energy efficiency programs.  As Casten and 
Ayres explain: “Regulators approve rates that are supposed to provide a ‘reasonable’ return on 
invested capital. This encourages capital investment, regardless of efficiency…. With approved 
rates in place, the utility’s profits hinge on throughput – how much electricity flows through their 
wires.  More sales, more profits. Actions that lead to conservation, appliance efficiency gains, and 
local generation all penalize utility profits.”39  Fixing the problem of revenue erosion and 
decoupling profits from sales is critical to incentivizing the efficient use of electricity.  
 
Problems associated with utility ratemaking practices and their disincentives to energy efficiency 
were a major focus of the National Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (NAPEE). Developed by a 
Leadership Group composed of more than 50 leading organizations representing diverse 
stakeholder perspectives, the Action Plan was released on July 21, 2006. It focuses on these cost 
recovery problems, noting that regulatory policies governing utilities have more commonly 
compensated utilities for building power plants and selling energy, while discouraging energy 
efficiency even when saving energy costs less than generating energy.  Ratemaking practices must 
be reformed for utilities to remain financially healthy while promoting the efficient use of energy 
by their ratepayers. Specifically, NAPEE recommends that stakeholders “Modify policies to align 
utility incentives with the delivery of cost-effective energy efficiency and modify ratemaking 
practices to promote energy efficiency investments.”40  
 
Electricity pricing policies of State legislatures and regulatory commissions also prevent markets 
from operating efficiently and create obstacles to low-carbon power choices. For example, the 
price of electricity in most retail markets today is not based on time of use. It therefore does not 
reflect the time-of-use costs of electricity production, which can vary by a factor of ten within a 
single day. Because peaking plants are more expensive to run than baseload plants, retail 
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electricity rates are higher during peak times than during shoulder and off-peak times under time-
of-use pricing. Yet most customers in traditionally regulated markets buy electricity under time-
constant prices that are set months or years ahead of actual use; as a result current market 
structures actually block price signals from reaching consumers, and consumers are not 
responsive to the price volatility of wholesale electricity.41  
 
Time-of-use pricing would encourage customers to use energy more efficiently during high-price 
periods.  Similarly, the lack of time-of-use pricing and time-of-use (TOU) rates is a barrier to 
solar photovoltaics (PV) and other generation resources that provide power disproportionately 
during on-peak periods, because they are not paid for this added benefit but rather are reimbursed 
at the same price per kWh as an off-peak resource. Widespread time-of-use pricing would 
provide significant incentives for distributed generation including renewables. When net-
metering is used in conjunction with time-of-use pricing, customers who generate electricity 
during the day (when use is at peak and prices are high) could offset their costs for electricity 
used off-peak when prices are low.42  
 
Imbalance penalties charged by utilities pose challenges to renewable power profitability 
because of the intermittency of wind and solar PV. Many power markets were set up to bid a day 
ahead. The utility contracted to provide so many MWs of power generation, committing to 
certain power output requirements. If power generation deviated from this projection, severe 
penalties were levied. These penalties reflected the extra cost incurred to have reserve units 
running and ready to replace the idle load (0.1 to 0.5 cents per kWh). In order to allow 
renewables to compete more effectively, imbalance payments have evolved in some states, and 
additional reform is needed.43 For example, in some parts of California at the end of the month, 
the scheduled power has to balance out. If the utility is consistently wrong, the imbalance 
payment has to be paid, but not otherwise.  
 
In sum, because of these utility pricing policies, neither electricity generators, wires companies, 
nor consumers see the full value of efficiency or distributed generation.  Without better price 
signals, it is challenging for the providers of energy-efficient products and on-site generators to 
transform consumer markets.   
 
B. Ineffective fiscal policies.  Some fiscal policies simply do not meet their intended objective or 
are at cross-purposes with their stated goal of stimulating the deployment of clean energy 
technologies. Tax credits for clean energy investments that cannot be claimed and property taxes 
that encourage deforestation are cases in point. 
 
Several tax credits passed in legislation cannot be claimed by the targeted markets and therefore 
fail to achieve the anticipated market penetration of energy-efficient devices and systems. For 
instance: 
 
• In 2005, EPAct44 authorized a tax credit for fuel cells ($1,000/kW or 30 percent of the 
total cost, whichever is less), and the provision was enacted into law effective January 1, 
2006.45 However, the IRS has yet to establish guidelines that would clarify the eligibility 
criteria and spell out procedures for claiming the credit.46 Companies have to spend large 
amounts of money with consultants to figure out how to use the tax credit. Yet the credit 
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will expire at the end of 2007. Planning cannot be done cost-effectively around two-year 
tax programs.47 
• Several of the tax credits for individuals have limited value because of the Alternative 
Minimum Tax (AMT),48 which sets a floor for tax liability and can prevent those subject 
to AMT from claiming credits.49 Examples for individuals are the tax credits for hybrid 
electric vehicles and residential photovoltaic systems.50 Similarly, more and more of the 
large industry tax credits are becoming less of a viable strategy because of the AMT. 
Many large companies already qualify for the AMT so the tax code is not moving industry 
any further along.51 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 provided independent domestic oil 
developers with relief from AMT,52 but did not do so for renewable generation or energy 
efficiency technologies.53 
• The maximum business credit deduction has also reached eligible thresholds for many 
companies.  The internal revenue code requires that in any tax year a company may not 
reduce its payable taxes by more than 50 percent.54 Firms can carry unused credits over 
for five years, but many are still maxed out even with this rollover provision.55 These 
companies qualify for more tax credits than they can use, so the credits are often not being 
fully used. Piling more tax credits on is not effective. When considering EPAct 2005 tax 
credits, ACEEE reduced the expectation by at least a third because they expect at least a 
third of the firms will not be able to use them.56 
 
Ineffective fiscal policies are not just the purview of the federal government; they also exist at the 
state and local level. Of particular importance to the viability of biomass as a renewable resource 
for transportation fuels, electricity, and chemicals is the tax treatment of farmland and forests. 
Many states have property tax laws that provide incentives for landowners to develop their 
forestland rather than leave the forest standing.57  These development incentives are found when 
forestlands are taxed based on their location (ad valorem), or are not exempted from taxation 
when the forests are conserved.  Almost all states tax property based on ad valorem values while 
only four offer exemptions for forestlands (Figure 3).  These local land values, and corresponding 
taxes, may rise due to urban sprawl or other drivers of new residential or commercial building in 
an area, but the value of the timber stand tends not to increase accordingly.  A transition in the 
ownership structure of forests from vertically integrated forest products companies to investment 
trusts or investment management organizations is also occurring largely due to the double 
taxation of harvested timber resources. This fiscally driven shift in land ownership may also 
contribute to reductions in forestland as investment firms search for the “highest or best use” of 
property.58  Future cellulosic ethanol production across the country depends upon the maintenance 
of forest resources and the landowner-to-timber-industry infrastructure.59 
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C. Fiscal Uncertainty 
 
Policies that subsidize energy technologies on an inconsistent and sporadic basis do not motivate 
rational market behavior. Similarly, future uncertainty related to penalties for GHG emissions 
also distort investment options. 
 
1. Fiscal incentives. Fluctuating and sporadic fiscal incentives lead to uncertainty as well as 
abandonment of initiatives before their potential can be realized.  This is particularly the case for 
capital-intensive improvements and technologies that require a large investment for an uncertain 
return. 
 
Figure 3. Differential Property Tax by State 
 
(source of data: http://www.timbertax.org/statetaxes/quickreference.asp) 
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One example of this is the renewable production tax credit (PTC), which provides a tax credit for 
each kWh of electricity generated by qualified technologies.60 These tax credits were initially 
made available for the first ten years of operation for all qualifying plants that entered service 
from 1992 through mid-1999. The subsidy was later extended to 2001, then to 2003, and again 
with EPAct 2005 to the end of 2007. In 2006, the provisions were extended for an additional two 
years, ending seven years of on-again/off-again subsidies. Because planning and permitting for 
new wind turbines takes about two years, expirations of the PTC contribute to investment 
downturns even if reauthorized shortly afterwards. Fig. 3 shows how PTC reauthorization 
stimulates market activity, and how PTC expiration is promptly followed by declines in capacity 
additions.61  The tax credit has created a sellers market resulting in increased competition for the 
wind production capacity, which is currently sold out into 2008, raising prices due to “supply 
and demand” by roughly 50 percent to $1600/KW today. Further, with the sporadic tax credits, 
production is geared to the short-term, which is not necessarily the most efficient – focusing on 
an accelerated timetable instead of optimizing production over the long-run by, for instance, 
investing in longer-term facility needs, systems, and personnel training.  
 
State or local production incentives, similar to the federal PTC, are available in at least five 
states, adding another layer of geographic diversity and inconsistency. The variability across 
states for incentives and programs for renewable energy and energy efficiency can be seen using 
the Databases for State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) web data 
application.62  
 
2. Fiscal penalties. Investors must often choose between certain financial gains and uncertain 
financial penalties when looking at options for the future.  When possible taxation or costing for 
Fig. 4.  Annual Installed Wind Energy Capacity 
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GHG emissions is unknown, investors may choose to delay adoption of clean energy 
technologies while their tax treatment is being debated.  A clear example of this is the market for 
CO2 storage and sequestration, but it also occurs in other climate change technology areas. For 
instance, Chad Holliday, the C.E.O. of DuPont, told Thomas Friedman that he is reluctant to 
expand the corporate investment in ethanol because he cannot anticipate what the price of 
ethanol will be. “What are the regulations going to be? Is the ethanol subsidy going to be 
reduced? Will we put a tax on oil to keep ethanol competitive? If I know that, it gives me a price 
target to go after. Without that, I don’t know what the market is and my shareholders don't know 
how to value what I am doing.”63 
 
Long-term financial uncertainties are particularly relevant to projects that involve carbon 
sequestration, where issues of liability over the full duration of projects are largely unresolved. 
During the operational phase of CO2 storage projects, financial responsibility and liability reside 
with either the owner of the CO2 and/or the operator of the storage facility. In the long-term, the 
turnover of responsible parties poses risk and uncertainty to investors and stakeholders. Success 
may require the establishment of government bonds or trust funds, privately backed insurance 
funds, or public-private partnerships.64 Until such long-term risk management strategies are 
established through public-private dialogue, the financial uncertainties will hold back carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) projects. 
 
II. REGULATORY BARRIERS 
 
A regulation is a legal restriction promulgated by government administrative agencies through 
rulemaking supported by a threat of sanction or a fine. Regulations are imposed in pursuit of the 
public good to produce outcomes that might not otherwise occur, but they can become 
impediments to innovation and competition. Common examples of regulation include attempts to 
control market entries, prices, wages, pollution, and standards of production and performance. 
Regulatory barriers that arise in the market include unfavorable and ineffective regulatory policies 
that disadvantage clean energy technologies and impede efficient market functioning. In addition, 
fluctuating, variable, and unpredictable regulations can undermine marketplace efficiency by 
introducing policy uncertainty.  
 
A. Unfavorable Regulatory Policies 
 
Regulations are typically seen as instruments of change – encouraging innovation, pollution 
prevention, safety, and standardization. However, they can also be distortionary, onerous, and 
barriers to progress when they regulate or unequally impact markets in which a technology is 
expected to compete. This section describes several distortionary performance and connection 
standards and burdensome permitting processes that handicap the market penetration of clean 
energy technologies. 
 
1. Environmental Performance Standards. A number of deeply imbedded regulatory systems 
favor conventional energy sources and technologies. Examples are drawn from regulations in the 
electric power sector – new source review and input-based emissions standards. 
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As part of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments Congress established the New Source Review 
(NSR) program and modified it in the 1990 Amendments, but exempted old coal plants from the 
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) to be set. 65 66 NSPS are standards issued by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to dictate the level of pollution that a new stationary 
source may produce.67  These standards are intended to promote use of the best air pollution 
control technologies, taking into account the cost of such technology and any other non-air 
quality, health, and environmental impact and energy requirements. These standards apply only 
to electric generating units that have been constructed or modified since the proposal of the 
standard. This “grandfathering” has enabled the continued operation of some of the most 
polluting and highest CO2-emitting electricity generators in the country far beyond their normal 
life,68 and some contend that it has resulted in the underutilization of newer power plants because 
of their compliance burdens .69 “NSR thus imposes pollution controls where they are least 
needed and artificially inflates the value of the dirtiest plants.”70 
 
Many studies show that several percentage points of efficiency improvement can be squeezed 
out of the current coal fleet.71 However, investment in an upgrade could trigger an NSR, and the 
threat of such a review has prevented many upgrades from occurring.72  NSR is a preconstruction 
permitting program that assures the dual goals of maintaining and attaining air quality and 
providing for economic growth. These goals are achieved through installation of state-of-the-art 
control technology at new plants and at existing plants that undergo a major modification.73  
However, uncertainty about the scope of such requirements has become a significant disincentive 
to rebuilding existing generating units that could ultimately result in greater energy efficiency or 
even lower emissions. Altogether, these effects have led some critics to question whether the 
NSR program and the NSPS have resulted in higher levels of pollution than would have occurred 
in the absence of regulation.74  
 
On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Environmental Defense v. Duke 
Energy Corporation, that clarifies these requirements. It imposed an annual new source review 
test on sources unless and until EPA changes its regulations. On April 25, 2007, the EPA 
proposed further options to change the emissions increase test used to determine if the NSR 
permitting program would apply when an existing power plant makes a physical or operational 
change.  Under EPA’s new option, if a physical or operational change would not increase an 
electric generating unit’s hourly emission, major NSR would not apply. If a generating unit’s 
hourly emissions would increase, then projected annual emissions would be reviewed using the 
annual emissions increase provisions in the current rules and a generating unit would be subject 
to major NSR if the annual emissions would increase but not if annual emissions do not 
increase.75 The unintended “effect” of discouraging plant upgrades could be heightened by this 
2007 U.S. Supreme Court decision and follow-up EPA guidelines by closing loopholes that 
previously allowed power plants to be expanded and upgraded without triggering NSR reviews. 
 
The nation's current regulatory approach to air pollution – using “input-based emission 
standards” – is also unfavorable to advancing clean energy technologies. “Input-based emissions 
standards” assess emissions based on fuel inputs into a power plant, and because they pay no 
attention to how much electricity or heat is provided by the plant, they fail to reward energy-
efficient plants, those producing the same amount or more electricity while emitting fewer 
pollutants.76 An “output-based” approach would reward those power generators for producing 
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more useful energy (heat and power) from the same amount of fuel input, while emitting fewer 
pollutants. Output-based standards could advance an array of innovative power technologies 
including CHP, which puts to productive use much of the heat that is wasted in conventional 
power plants. Only output-based measurements can capture the total efficiency provided from a 
single source of fuel producing both electricity and thermal energy. The EPA has a guidance 
document on how to promulgate and implement output-based standards, the California Energy 
Commission and the South Coast Air Quality Management District have adopted output-based 
standards, and other organizations support them. However, only a few state and local air 
permitting agencies have adopted them, and EPA’s Region 9 refuses to enact them.77 
 
2. Connection Standards 
 
Connection standards are designed to prevent unnecessary fluctuations in the electric system from 
improperly functioning, or out-of-phase, electric generators.  These standards keep the electric 
system safe from fires, surges, brown-outs, and black-outs; however, in some cases, their 
application can be seen as onerous rather than due diligence. Distortionary connection standards, 
like bans on private wires and metering rules, have historically inhibited the installation of 
distributed generation (DG) systems in the United States.78   
 
For example, consider the universal ban on private electric wires crossing public streets. While 
this ban maintains safety on roadways by preventing the introduction of wires lower than posted 
height limits, specifications could be designed to permit private wires. This ban forces would-be 
power entrepreneurs to use their competitors’ wires to deliver electricity to their customers. In 
combination with generally high prices for moving such power, this ban on private electric wires 
penalizes local generation, which offers the potential for high-efficiency power delivery.79  
 
The ability to legally connect DG equipment to the grid depends on federal, state, and local rules 
and regulations. The legal right to connect to the grid is provided for in federal laws such as the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 and by state net metering statutes.80 
State-to-state variations in net metering policies cause confusion in the marketplace and raise the 
cost of completing DG projects. Net metering, an option to overcome barriers caused by 
variations in metering policies, allows customers with small generating facilities to use a single 
meter to measure both power drawn from the grid and power fed back into the grid from on-site 
generation. When a customer installation generates more power than it consumes, power flows 
into the grid and the meter runs backward. Net metering allows customers to receive retail prices 
for the excess electricity they generate. When combined with time-of-use pricing, this can result 
in an attractive value for PV power and other on-site power production.81  In states that do not 
have net metering, a second meter must be installed to measure the electricity flowing back to 
the host utility, and the utility purchases the power at a rate typically much lower than the retail 
price—which is a disincentive to the development of distributed generation.82 
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More than 40 states now have net metering laws, which allow a two-way flow of electricity 
between the electricity distribution grid and customers with their own generation (Fig. 583). 
State-to-state variations in regulations impose significant burdens on project developers.84 
Mueller examined the policy instruments in use related to CHP adoption and the actual adoption 
rates for three types of facilities in Illinois: hospitals, schools, and others.85  He found that 
organizations tended to search for CHP to achieve energy savings potential, but they considered 
regulatory complexity as an obstacle when making the adoption decision. 
 
B. Ineffective Regulations.  
Ineffective features of regulations and weak regulatory enforcement can lead to suboptimal 
outcomes that hinder clean energy technologies.  Examples of ineffective regulations include 
regulatory loopholes, poor land-use planning, and burdensome permitting processes. 
 
1. Regulatory Loopholes. Contained within otherwise effective regulations, one often finds 
particular clauses and specifications that subvert the goals of the laws. Such is the case with the 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. Several examples illustrate the ways in 
which the CAFE standards are ineffective or have been redesigned in conflict with the law’s 
original intent of increasing fuel economy.86 Specifically, these standards: 
 
• Exempt vehicles over 8500 pounds of gross vehicle weight (e.g., Ford Expedition, 
Hummer, Lincoln Armada) and ignore large light trucks – such as passenger and cargo 
vans.  
• Preempt states from setting more restrictive fuel economy standards than those in the 
federal legislation. 
• Credit vehicles for flexible fuel (E-85 capability) regardless of how they are fueled after 
purchase; the National Academies found that “The provision creating extra credits for 
Fig. 5.  Geographic Variability of Net Metering Rules  
 
Numbers given are the maximum system size, in kW [residential/commercial/industrial] 
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multifuel vehicles has had, if any, a negative effect on fuel economy, petroleum 
consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, and cost.  These vehicles seldom use any fuel 
other than gasoline yet enable automakers to increase their production of less fuel 
efficient vehicles.”87 
• Allow car manufacturers to average fuel economies across a broad array of vehicles 
which creates an incentive for using very efficient smaller vehicles to offset inefficient 
larger vehicles.  For example, trucks are held to a lower CAFE standard than cars, so 
Chrysler  and Dodge benefit from having the PT Cruiser and the Magnum, which are cars 
in the eyes of consumers, classified as trucks under rules developed by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 1975.88  
 
Such legal loopholes that undermine the goal of fuel economy can be explained in part by the 
existence of conflicting policy goals. “There is a marked inconsistency between pressing 
automotive manufacturers for improved fuel economy from new vehicles on the one hand and 
insisting on low real gasoline prices on the other.”89 
 
2. Land Use Planning. State and local governmental bodies are responsible for land-use 
planning in the United States. The planning process involves a mosaic of approaches, often 
displaying limited sensitivity to environmental goals. The automobile-dominant suburban 
environment, with its large carbon footprint, is the result of unfettered growth, with limited 
planning attention given to smart growth characterized by sidewalks and bike paths, rail systems 
and mixed-use developments that shorten the distance to work and promote the use of mass 
transit. Indeed, Greene (2006) argues that the main motivation for inefficient modes of travel is 
the built environment created without integrated land planning strategies.90 As described by the 
Department of Energy’s Smart Communities website, inefficient sprawling urban environments 
have been created by a combination of “zoning ordinances that isolate employment locations, 
shopping and services, and housing locations from each other” and “low-density growth 
planning aimed at creating automobile access to increasing expanses of land.”91  This urban 
sprawl leads to higher than necessary energy consumption, due mostly to increased 
transportation needs.  Fig. 6 shows how urban environments compare in terms of transportation 
CO2 emissions per household. 
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Sprawling urban land use patterns in the U.S. have caused the amount of urbanized land area to 
grow two to three times faster than the metropolitan area.92 The result is rapid increases in 
vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and shrinkage of the forest land available to absorb CO2.93 Zoning 
for low-density urban development contributes to sprawl and locks in dependence on cars by 
undermining the ability to support transit and to promote walking and cycling. Most subdivision 
regulations, parking and street design standards also pose barriers to smart growth projects, as do 
various distortionary fiscal policies such as the link between federal transportation funding and 
VMT levels.94 As Growing Cooler explains, “the key to substantial GHG reductions is to get all 
policies, funding, incentives, practices, rules, codes, and regulations pointing in the same 
direction to create the right conditions for smart growth.”95   
 
3. Permitting Processes. The market penetration of many clean energy technologies is hindered 
by onerous permitting processes. Examples highlighted below cover geological carbon 
sequestration and the siting of on-shore wind farms. 
 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects are challenged by inadequate regulatory frameworks 
typical of new products. Currently, there are no uniform guidelines regulating geologic carbon 
sequestration projects; as a result, regulatory issues are addressed mostly on a case-by-case basis 
in contracts for a particular project. Applicants prepare individual statements for underground 
injection of CO2, and EPA must review each injection well for adequacy.96 This creates 
uncertainty and confusion and raises concern about the long-term environmental and economic 
integrity of the projects.97 A generic process could streamline these injection projects. Doing 
“permitting by rule” would be useful. EPA could specify the necessary characteristics in a 
checklist of requirements so that applications can be more uniform.  
 
Figure 6. Low-Density Zoning Promotes Travel-Related CO2 Emissions 
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(source of data: San Francisco League of Conservation Voters calculator, 
http://www.sflcv.org/density/index.html, December 6, 2004.) 
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Environmental permitting for land-based wind projects falls under the purview of regulations 
promulgated by a maze of local, county, state, and federal agencies. In addition to the litigation 
implications of these numerous requirements, each individual permit provides an opportunity for 
wind projects to be challenged.98 Permitting processes are also problematic for off-shore wind.  
In 2005, Minerals Management Services in the U.S. Department of Interior was given authority 
for offshore wind (and ocean energy) siting. 99 However, the agency has not yet specified its 
procedures, creating delays in the permitting process.100 Since success in the marketplace is 
facilitated by minimizing the risk of litigation and public opposition, wind projects are 
particularly handicapped by onerous permitting requirements. 
 
C. Regulatory Uncertainty 
 
Energy markets face numerous uncertainties even when operating within stable tax and 
regulatory framework. Today’s markets are particularly unpredictable due to ambiguities about 
possible future GHG regulations and tax treatments. Investors, electric utilities, vehicle 
manufacturers, and other key stakeholders who deal with fuel futures must decide what to build 
as a next generation of power plants and transportation fuels, not knowing if CO2 and other 
GHGs will remain unregulated.  The 109th Congress processed more than 100 climate change-
related proposals,101 and the 110th Congress appears to be seeing an even greater level of climate 
policy activity. When the basis for estimating long-term operating costs and competitive 
advantage is so uncertain, how are consumers to make “rational” choices about the purchase of 
new energy-using systems and how are producers to decide whether or not to invest in 
alternative energy technologies? All of the uncertainties associated with the treatment of GHG 
externalities are impediments to positive action.102 Examples of regulatory uncertainty impacting 
clean energy technologies include lack of “waste confidence” for the disposal of spent nuclear 
fuels; lack of clarity regarding the classification of CO2; uncertain siting regulations for off-shore 
wind (see discussion under section “permitting processes”); and uncertain codes and standards 
for hydrogen storage and transport. These examples are described below, following a broader 
description of impacts of regulatory uncertainty. 
 
An increasing number of U.S. companies have been participating in voluntary greenhouse gas 
emission reduction programs and registries to prepare for eventual federal regulations. But 
whether or not these early actions will receive credit in any future GHG cap and trade program 
depends on future congressional legislation. To add further complexity to this already uncertain 
situation, the existing greenhouse gas emissions reduction registries in the United States differ in 
ways that could affect the provision of credit under future federal legislation.103 These 
uncertainties contribute to a “wait-and-see” attitude among many GHG emitters. 
 
The speedy deployment of low-carbon technologies, as with many novel products and systems, 
can also be inhibited by missing or inadequate regulations, monitoring and verification 
procedures, and insufficient guidelines, codes and standards necessary for coordinating and 
interconnecting industry networks. Considering the commercialization and deployment of 
technology in terms of knowledge imbedded in linked systems and subsystems, it is not 
surprising that novel technologies face unique systems barriers that incumbent technologies no 
longer suffer because: the dominant technologies already benefit from mature and well 
understood regulatory systems.104 When new technologies are getting ready for 
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commercialization, developers need to know how the technology will be treated by the law.  
Having codes and standards in place before technologies come to the marketplace can ensure 
uniformity and safety, and reduces business risk.  A compelling example of this need for new 
codes and standards is hydrogen-based products and systems.  Standards will be necessary 
relative to purity, pressure, material thicknesses, as well as the certification of workers and many 
other features.105   
 
Nuclear power plant operators face uncertainties as to whether or not they will be allowed to 
construct and operate new nuclear power plants; these uncertainties include the need for ‘waste 
confidence’ and a new regulatory regime. New nuclear plants cannot be built until the federal 
regulating agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) provides a statement of ‘waste 
confidence’. Power plant operators have no control over this statement, and favorable waste 
confidence relies upon another federal body – the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).106  DOE is 
responsible for taking ownership of used fuel from nuclear power plants; to date, this has not 
occurred, so nuclear power plant operators are storing fuel onsite in spent fuel pools and dry 
storage.  The NRC has not stated that onsite storage will be sufficiently permanent to result in 
‘waste confidence’.  The NRC is also working under a new regulatory process for certifying new 
nuclear power plants through the combined construction and operating license; one investor 
(NRG) has submitted a request for this new license – testing the process.  Investors face 
considerable uncertainty as to how this new process will impact their construction and operating 
lead time.  In this environment of uncertainty, investors must “get in line” for some products well 
in advance of knowing whether or not they will ever build the plant.   
 
Various definitional and classification issues regarding CO2 sequestration remain unresolved, 
adding uncertainty to the development of CCS projects. CO2 can either be classified as an 
industrial product or as a waste product – a distinction that is important because industrial 
projects are typically subject to less stringent environmental regulations than waste disposal 
projects.107 Existing federal air regulations do not define CO2 as a pollutant, but some states have 
already defined CO2 as a waste, an air contaminant, or a pollutant.108 Classification 
inconsistencies could negatively impact CCS development because of the added burden 
associated with waste management.109 For example, the federal Marine Protection Research and 
Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) governs the legality of carbon dioxide sequestration in the subseabed 
beneath U.S. territorial waters.110 It specifically prohibits “dumping” industrial waste into ocean 
waters.111 Thus, if CO2 is “industrial waste” and if subseabed carbon dioxide sequestration 
constitutes “dumping into ocean waters,” then it is prohibited. However, there is statutory 
ambiguity about these terms, which contributes to business risks and impedes investment in this 
clean energy technology.112 
 
In general, regulatory uncertainties keep industry from innovating and deter consumers from 
purchasing clean energy products. In some cases, regulatory uncertainty comes in the form of 
conflicting policy priorities. As described by the National Academies, policy inconsistencies 
limit reductions in fuel consumption, “There is a marked inconsistency between pressing 
automotive manufacturers for improved fuel economy from new vehicles on the one hand and 
insisting on low real gasoline prices on the other.”113 
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III. STATUTORY BARRIERS 
 
Typically, statutes command, prohibit, or declare policy in pursuit of the public good, but they 
can become impediments to markets for clean energy technologies. Statutes are written laws set 
down by a legislature in response to a perceived need to clarify the functioning of government, 
improve civil order, answer a public need, codify existing law, or provide special treatment for 
an individual or company. In addition to the statutes passed by the national or state legislature, 
lower authorities or municipalities may also enact statutes. While these enactments are 
subordinate to the law of the whole state or nation, they are nonetheless a part of the body of a 
jurisdiction’s statutory law.  
 
Numerous local, state and federal statutes inhibit deployment of clean energy technologies. Some 
statutes are unfavorable, while others are uncertain.  Due to the strong reliance on regulatory 
agencies for implementing most policies that impact clean energy technologies, there are 
instances where the line between statutes and regulations is unclear; for this reason, ineffective 
statutes are difficult to identify separate from ineffective regulation – described above. 
 
A. Unfavorable Statutes 
 
The lack of modern and enforceable building codes acts as a barrier to the deployment of green 
building technologies. In addition, procurement policies in many states prevent energy saving 
performance contracting from using private-sector resources to upgrade the energy integrity of 
state government buildings.  
 
1. Lack of modern and enforceable building codes. There is great variability in the level of 
energy efficiency required by state building codes. For example, eighteen states have adopted the 
2003 International Energy Conservation Code, while nine states have energy codes that are more 
than a decade old or follow no energy code at all.114 The dominance of local interests helps 
explain why there are several thousand different code specifications. These code variations 
fragment the market and contribute to manufacturing inefficiencies.115   
 
Building standards can be distortionary, in spite of their numerous positive influences including 
the well-known success reducing the energy required by household refrigerators.116 Because 
codes and standards take a long time to adopt and modify, they sometimes specify obsolete 
technologies, thereby inhibiting innovation and encouraging obsolete technology. The 
RESCHECK code for assisting building code implementation allows tradeoffs between 
technologies to meet the overall code; in some cases, these tradeoffs lead to distortions when 
credits are allowed for common practices, preventing improvements in efficiency.117 For 
example, in the upper Midwest there is upwards of 80 percent penetration of condensing gas 
furnaces.  The tradeoffs to meet the code allow savings from this now common high efficiency 
furnace to be used to offset poor envelopes.118 As a result, this code specification is no longer 
promoting improved building practices because it has not adapted to technology advances.  
Codes that are outdated or fail to adapt to changing available technologies can represent lost 
opportunities to improve energy efficiency. 
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Table 1.  Varying Renewable Portfolio Standards 
2. State procurement policies. Over the past decade, energy service companies have become 
important players in delivering energy-efficiency upgrades to industrial and commercial markets 
and government facilities through the use of energy-saving performance contracts (ESPCs).119 
Increasingly, this contracting mechanism is being used by state and federal government agencies 
to upgrade the energy efficiency of government-owned buildings. Recognizing the value of this 
funding mechanism, EPAct 2005 extended the authority of the federal government to engage in 
ESPCs.  
 
Many state constitutions, however, do not allow the obligation of funds in advance of their being 
appropriated. In some of these states, this requirement is seen as prohibiting multi-year 
contracting with energy services companies. Another barrier to third-party financing is the scoring 
practices of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The CBO scores the costs and not the 
savings of ESPC contracts. The costs are real because they are in the contract, but the savings are 
not scored because they do not yet exist. There are similar problems with lease-purchases, where 
the lease payments incorporate the added first cost of the more expensive energy-efficient 
product, but the scoring does not include the savings.120 
 
B. Statutory Uncertainty 
 
The expectation of a stream of immediate and future benefits drives most investment and 
consumption decisions. Uncertainty is a deterrent to investment and it is particularly problematic 
when new clean energy technologies are being launched into a market where codes and standards 
have not been developed, policies are expected, statutes fluctuate over time, and “the rules” vary 
from place-to-place. 
 
1. Mosaic of Clean Energy 
Portfolio Standards.  
Differences across state laws 
add confusion in the 
marketplace for clean energy 
technologies. They also thwart 
the economies of scale that can 
result from national markets.  
  
Many states have recently 
adopted Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS) or Sustainable 
Energy Performance Standards 
(SEPS) requiring that a portion 
of electricity sold by utilities in 
a state come from particular 
renewable sources or be 
avoided through improvements 
to energy production and 
energy end-use efficiencies.  
Because electricity providers 
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do not reside completely within the bounds of states (electricity is an interstate product), 
variation in these laws can be costly and onerous for utilities. These laws vary not only by their 
percentage goals and timelines for renewable energy, but also by the renewable resources and 
technologies that are eligible (see Table 1121).122   
 
2. Uncertain property rights. Uncertainty about property ownership is a barrier for several 
clean energy technologies including carbon capture and storage (CCS), coal bed and coal mine 
methane, and wind generation. 
 
For CCS, the three main areas of property rights are surface (rights pertaining to the location of 
CO2 injections), sub-surface (rights associated with underground reservoirs), and rights to the 
CO2 itself.123 The surface and gas rights are generally not under question, but the deep subsurface 
property rights are not established or not applied consistently.  When CO2 is injected 
underground, it is not clear who needs to be paid and who has the right of refusal. Existing sub-
surface rights are not uniform: for oil, the rights are attached to the surface, and the mineral 
rights are owned separately based on sub-surface rights; water is treated differently. It is unclear 
how large-scale CO2 injection will be treated. Can the surface owner deny rights? If the injected 
fluid goes beyond the surface boundaries, the floor space a mile deep in adjacent lots may or may 
not be available to that well. There is one case that provides a precedent for broad property 
rights. DOE’s FutureGen project has assumed that the well owner must own the entire land 
footprint over the impacted floorspace. Resolution of the ownership of CO2 storage rights 
(reservoir pore space) is needed before CCS approaches can proliferate.124   
 
Ownership issues similarly impede the recovery of methane from coal beds and coal mines. If 
the coal mine draws methane from under properties owned by others, land ownership can be 
unclear. Ownership of the gas also could raise reporting issues for the mine owner. Statutory 
uncertainty is created because there is variability among states as to the legal ownership of 
resources, land, and gas. Owners of the coal, surface land, coalbed methane, and mineral rights 
may be different entities, complicating negotiations for recovery of the gas and access to the 
land. The Supreme Court found that federal coal leases granted under the 1909 and 1910 Coal 
Lands Acts did not include coalbed methane as part of the coal lease, impeding potential 
recovery.125 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is involved in resolving this property 
rights issue; separate leases may need to be negotiated.  EPAct 1992126 attempted to resolve the 
issue, providing model legislation, but many states did not adopt it. Mine-by-mine solutions are 
being developed for a small number of mines.127  
 
For wind technologies, Wilson notes a pressing problem related to wind rights contracts for 
small landowners.128  Wind rights are generally recognized under two common law doctrines: the 
united fee ownership rule (the idea that a landowner’s property rights extend to everything from 
the center of the earth to the sky, such as rainfall from clouds over their property) dictates a legal 
right to harvest the wind that blows across one’s land, in contrast, traditional mineral rights 
doctrine (which establishes that surface rights may remain in the possession of one person or 
entity, while the right to extract various minerals lies with another) suggests that wind, like oil 
and natural gas, is a resource that can be sold.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The “market-failure model” guiding public policy debates today suggests that markets should be 
left alone by government unless market failures exist.129 In competitive and efficient markets, 
suppliers produce what consumers want and are willing to pay for. However, when market 
failures exist, prices do not accurately reflect total costs, and it is legitimate to consider public 
intervention. This rationale has led to the creation of large-scale government involvement in 
energy markets in an attempt to fix or compensate for voluminous market failures. 130 
 
This paper has shown that these interventions have produced an array of “public failures”131 that 
now need to be reformed. They are of special interest because they are imposed by legislators 
and regulators through tax laws, regulations and statutes. By hindering the deployment of clean 
energy technologies, they are at cross-purposes with U.S. government intentions to reduce GHG 
emissions.132 This paper describes more than 30 of these barriers and it characterizes them as 
distortionary because of their unfavorable, ineffective, or uncertain features that slow or block 
the market uptake of clean energy technologies (Table 2).   
 
Numerous unfavorable policies place clean energy technologies at a comparative disadvantage. 
Sometimes this is done by favoring competing technologies or by precluding technological 
change and thereby supporting incumbent technologies. Environmental standards enable the 
continued operation of some of the most polluting generators in the country far beyond their 
normal life and perversely disincentivize investing in plant upgrades. Conflicting social goals 
often explain these public failures: cheap energy is preferred over clean energy, and the desire to 
promote U.S. oil independence trumps the goal of mitigating greenhouse gases. Legal inertia is 
another cause: laws often trail behind and thereby inhibit technological progress, as is true of 
building codes, CAFE standards, and tax depreciation schedules.   
 
Various ineffective policies exist which have design flaws that undermine their intended 
outcomes. Sometimes these occur in the form of loopholes as is the case with the fuel-economy 
standards for the nation’s vehicles. In other instances, tax credits for investments in clean energy 
technologies are authorized but they cannot be claimed. Burdensome procedures add unnecessary 
sluggishness to the process of technological change. Property taxes for forest land promote 
deforestation, and land-use planning continues to foster urban sprawl with its expanding carbon 
footprint. 
 
Policy uncertainty is pervasive in today’s energy markets. Investors and consumers face 
numerous uncertainties and ambiguities about possible future GHG regulations and tax 
treatments. These uncertainties contribute to a “wait-and-see” attitude among GHG emitters. 
Uncertainty results from state and local variability, fluctuating short-term policies, and extended 
debates about alternative future policy scenarios can preempt commitments to clean energy and 
investments in carbon-intensive energy options. Net-metering, environmental permitting, 
Renewable Portfolio Standards and many other “crazy-quilt” state-by-state policies hinder the 
development of national markets and the resulting economies of scale so necessary for new 
technologies to become cost-competitive. 
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These distortionary policies create confusion in the marketplace for energy technologies. A 
vigorous campaign of policy reform is needed to create a consistent, effective, and predictable 
policy environment where clear and reinforcing signals encourage the infusion of clean energy 
technologies to prevent large-scale global climate disruption.  
 
Table 2. Fiscal, regulatory, and statutory impediments to clean energy technologies 
 
The internal revenue code provides business deductions for the 
purchase of large light trucks. 
The gas-guzzler tax on cars (but not on light trucks) has discouraged 
the purchase of cars and encouraged the purchase of SUVs.  
Oil and gas depletion allowances allow owners to claim a depletion 
deduction for loss of their reserves. 
Government support for research on the production of liquid fuels from 
coal and the production of petroleum from shale oil and tar sands 
promotes carbon-intensive fuels. 
Tax subsidies 
The link between federal transportation funding and vehicle miles 
traveled rewards the growth of transportation energy use. 
The federal tax code discourages capital investments in general, as 
opposed to direct expensing of energy costs. 
The federal tax code forces firms to depreciate energy efficiency 
investments over a longer period of time than many other investments. 
Unequal taxation of 
capital and operating 
expenses Capital-intensive technologies (e.g., renewables and nuclear power 
plants) have a differentially higher tax burden than expense-intensive 
technologies (e.g., coal and natural gas plants). 
The import tariff for ethanol raises the cost of ethanol blends produced 
by domestic refineries. Unfavorable tariffs Utilities impose tariffs (including standby charges, buyback rates, and 
uplift fees) on small generators seeking to connect to the grid.  
Unfavorable electricity pricing policies present obstacles for an array of 
clean energy technologies; these include the regulated rate structure, 
lack of real-time pricing, and imbalance penalties. 
Unfavorable 
Fiscal Policies 
Utility pricing policies In traditionally regulated electricity markets, electric utilities face little 
incentive to promote energy efficiency or non-dispatchable distributed 
generation because utility company profits are a function of sales. 
The IRS has yet to establish guidelines that clarify the eligibility criteria 
and spell out procedures for claiming tax credit for fuel cells authorized 
in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
Tax credits intended to promote the purchase of hybrid electric vehicles 
and residential photovoltaic systems have limited value because of the 
Alternative Minimum Tax, which sets a floor for tax liability. 
The internal revenue code requires that in any tax year a company may 
not reduce its payable taxes by more than 50 percent, which prevents 
many firms from benefiting from tax deductions for clean energy 
investments.  
Ineffective fiscal 
policies 
 
Many states have property tax laws that provide incentives for 
landowners to develop their forestland for higher use rather than leave 
the forest standing or continue timber production.  
Fiscal incentives Financial incentives, like the production tax credits, that vary over time increase investment uncertainty. Fiscal 
Uncertainty Fiscal penalties 
Investors face uncertain costs for GHG emissions; when these possible 
future costs are weighed against certain higher capital costs for cleaner 
technologies, cleaner technologies are not likely to win. 
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Exempting existing facilities from strict emissions requirements placed 
on new plants discourages what would be naturally occurring 
technological progress. Performance Standards Emissions standards that are input based rather than output based 
discourage process improvements that would result in lower emissions. 
Unfavorable 
Regulatory 
Policies 
Connection 
Standards 
The ban on private electric wires crossing public streets penalizes local 
generation of electricity, which could reduce transmission losses and 
increase overall efficiency. 
Federal CAFE standards exempt vehicles over 8500 pounds gross 
vehicle weight, encouraging automakers to make heavier – rather than 
more efficient, trucks. 
States are prevented from setting more restrictive fuel economy 
standards than those in the federal CAFE legislation, so state policy 
innovation is limited. 
Regulatory 
Loopholes 
Federal CAFE standards also credit vehicles for flexible fuel (E-85 
capability) regardless of how they are fueled after purchase or their fuel 
mileage. 
Poor land-use 
planning 
Zoning for low-density urban development contributes to sprawl and 
locks in dependence on cars rather than multi-user transit. 
Several clean energy technologies, such as carbon capture and hydrogen, 
are challenged by inadequate regulatory frameworks. 
Ineffective 
Regulations 
Burdensome 
permitting processes 
Environmental permitting for land-based wind projects falls under the 
purview of regulations promulgated by a maze of local, county, state, 
and federal agencies, while off-shore wind faces a lack of permitting 
procedures. 
Regulatory 
Uncertainty 
 Regulatory uncertainty – regarding whether or not GHG will be 
regulated or how current technologies will fare under new regulatory 
processes – impedes rational investment decisions. 
Lack of modern and 
enforceable building 
codes 
Building codes that are not enforced, are based on outdated technology, 
or allow tradeoffs that mitigate use of existing technology discourage 
adoption of clean energy technologies. Unfavorable 
Statutes State procurement 
policies 
When state agencies cannot contract over more than one fiscal year, they 
are unable to take on capital improvements that are cost-effective in the 
long-run. 
Variable Clean 
Energy Portfolio 
Standards 
Many states have adopted renewable or efficiency portfolio standards for 
electric generation, but these vary greatly – making it difficult for utility 
investors to reduce emissions or improve efficiency through the most 
cost-effective means. Statutory 
Uncertainty 
Uncertain property 
rights 
Property rights for subsurface and above-surface areas are unclear.  In 
some cases, particularly coal-bed methane, geologic storage of carbon 
dioxide, and wind energy, property rights for these areas must be defined 
to provide investment certainty. 
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